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THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ IN THE GENOCIDE CASE: 
‘THE STATE AS PERPETRATOR OF GENOCIDE’
Lennert Breuker*
In this historic case between Bosnia and Serbia revolving around the question whether Serbia could 
be held responsible for the genocide at Srebrenica, the ICJ was requested to settle a dispute that 
was already subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the ICTY. The ICJ determined that in addition 
to individuals, the Genocide Convention also contains an obligation for States not to commit 
genocide, though such an obligation was never expressly formulated by the drafters. Hence the ICJ 
is competent to make a finding on genocide in order to ascertain a treaty violation by a State-party. 
This contribution will analyze the manner in which the Court dealt with a case of extreme gravity 
with regard to jurisdiction, procedural standards and substantive law. 
Introduction
In a much anticipated judgment delivered on 26 February 2007, the International Court of 
Justice finally ruled on the issue of State responsibility of Serbia under the 1948 Genocide 
Convention for acts committed or omitted between 1991 and 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 
The Court found by thirteen votes to two that Serbia had not committed genocide in Bosnia 
nor could be considered an accomplice in it. It did however find Serbia responsible for failing to 
prevent and punish the genocide that occurred at Srebrenica in July 1995, when approximately 
7000 Muslim males, widely differing in age, were massacred in the aftermath of the capture 
of this ‘safe area’. As the physical perpetrators of these massacres were the Bosnian Serb forces, 
the responsibility of Serbia would only arise if a relationship of a certain pedigree could be 
established between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb army of the Republika Srpska (hereinafter: 
VRS). 
With the specific aim of proving this relationship, Bosnia filed an application at the International 
Court of Justice on 20 March 1993 to initiate proceedings against Serbia on account of alleged 
violations of the Genocide Convention, in light of the substantial financial and military support 
given by Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs.2 In quite a macabre sense, the only instance where the 
Court ultimately found the allegation of genocide proven, Srebrenica, was still to occur at 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
*  Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Public International Law, Leiden University. The author wishes to thank Wim Muller, 
Larissa van den Herik, Jean D’Aspremont and Otto Spijkers for comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author remains 
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1  On 4 February 2003 the respondent State changed its name from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: FRY) 
to Serbia and Montenegro by way of adoption of a new constitutional Charter. For the sake of brevity, I will refer in this 
article to the FRY before 04-02-03, and to Serbia after that date. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia.
2  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 20 March 1993. 
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that time. But as the genocide was found to be committed by the VRS without Belgrade 
having effective control over or having issued instructions to the VRS, the Court was unable to 
attribute the genocide to Serbia. 
The initial reactions to this finding were quite critical to say the least. Several jurists opined that 
the restrictive legal standards the Court applied, such as the adherence to the ‘old’ standard of 
effective control, or the limited scope of complicity, amounted to nothing less than a ‘technical 
misstep’ or an ‘unrealistically high standard of proof’.3 However, these comments ignore the 
areas where the Court has arguably expanded the grounds for international responsibility 
of the State, also when that meant leaving the safe road of a restrictive interpretation of the 
Convention. In fact, in applying the Genocide Convention the Court had to operate at a 
relatively unexplored intersection of public international law and international criminal law, 
where the drafting history shows considerable ambiguity. It required a re-animation of the 
legal notion of State perpetrator ship that was only vaguely referred to in the Convention, but 
never formulated in detail by the drafters. As not uncommon for controversial notions, it was 
essentially left to the judiciary, in this case the ICJ, to clarify the matter. Though one might be 
critical about certain findings of the Court, a more nuanced reception is called for.       
In this contribution the main legal questions the Court was confronted with will be discussed 
in the order the Court dealt with them in this Judgment. Part I deals with jurisdiction. One 
of the main legal challenges in this case was posed by the issue of access to the Court of Serbia 
at the time of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections.4 The role of the issue of access in the 
preliminary stage of the case will be examined in section I. Section I.1 will briefly focus on 
the changed strategy of Serbia towards membership of the United Nations and its subsequent 
complicating impact on the issue of access. In section I.2 the solution of the Court will be 
analyzed. This entailed a full contradiction of its viewpoint on the issue of access as previously 
adopted in the Legality of the Use of Force5 cases of 2004, in order to pass jurisdiction and 
proceed to the merits. 
Part II deals with the applicable law and the way it was interpreted by the Court. As the Genocide 
Convention leaves considerable room for interpretation, the Court had to clarify the scope of 
each substantive State obligation that formed part of the dispute. Although all obligations merit 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3  See Ruth Wedgwood, ‘Slobodan Milosevic’s Last Waltz’, The New York Times, 12 March 2007, and Antonio Cassese, ‘A 
Judicial Massacre’, 27 February 2007, at: http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/antonio_cassese/2007/02/the_judicial_
massacre_of_srebr.html. 
4  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1996, p. 595, point 2 of the operative part.
5  Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and 
Montenegro v. Canada), Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France), Preliminary 
Objections; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany), Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use of Force 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy), Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands), 
Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal), Preliminary Objections; Legality of Use 
of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections; Judgments of 15 December 2004, available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org.
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further discussion, special attention will be given to the obligation not to commit genocide and 
the obligation to prevent genocide. The first on account of its potential impact on the concept 
of crime of State and the latter in light of the theme of extra-territoriality of this issue. Finally, 
the Court’s decision on the issue of reparation will be examined. 
Part III contains some general reflections on the possible implications this Judgment might 
have for the two points of interest mentioned above, the concept of crime of State and on the 
extra-territorial scope of the Conventions.
 
I. Jurisdiction: Access to the Court
Despite having already ruled upon jurisdiction in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections 
of 11 July 1996, the question whether Serbia possessed the capacity to have access to the 
Court remained a serious challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction during the entire course of the 
proceedings. The issue largely revolved around the questionable status of Serbia as a  member of 
the United Nations (hereinafter: UN), a highly political topic which explains the difficulties of 
the Court having to deal with it. 
The first instance where the Court had to address the issue was the Order on Provisional 
Measures of 8 April 1993.6 The Order followed a request of both parties to the dispute, asking 
for the indication of provisional measures with regard to the atrocities taking place in Bosnia. 
In a standard consideration the Court asserted that though it is not necessary to fully satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, it will only impose such measures if a 
prima facie basis can be ascertained upon which to establish jurisdiction.7 As nowadays most 
states are parties to the Statute of the Court, ascertaining jurisdiction ratione personae is mostly 
reduced to a formality.8 
The Genocide case is an a-typical case on jurisdiction however, as there were serious grounds for 
doubting whether Serbia had access to the Court in the first place. Article 35 (1) of the Statute, 
which deals with this issue, provides that access is reserved for parties to the Statute. This 
provision has to be read in conjunction with article 93 (1) of the UN Charter, which states that 
all members of the United Nations are automatically parties to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. Though this is the common way to gain access, the disintegration of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: SFRY) in the early 1990s left the legal 
status of the emerging state entities surrounded by uncertainty, particularly with regard to their 
UN membership.  While the seceded entities were eventually accepted as new members of the 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
6  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 
8 April1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 3, paras. 14-19.
7 Idem, para. 14.
8  See Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practise of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol.II  Jurisdiction, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff 2006, p. 597. 
9  Croatia and Slovenia seceded on 25 June 1991, Macedonia on 17 September 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 
March 1992. Subsequent dates of admission as Members of the United Nations: Croatia 22 May 1992 (A/RES/46/238), 
Slovenia 22 May 1992 (A/RES/46/236), Macedonia 8 April 1993 (A/RES/47/225) Bosnia and Herzegovia 22 May 
1992 (A/RES/46/237).  
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United Nations, the claim of the FRY to be the continuator of the SFRY met with considerable 
opposition. This was also noticed by the Security Council which stated in resolution 777 of 19 
September 1992:
“[…]
Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,
Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that ‘the claim by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia […] to continue automatically the membership 
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has 
not been generally accepted’, 
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia […] cannot continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General 
Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia […] should 
apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in 
the work of the General Assembly”;10
The General Assembly integrally adopted the viewpoint of the Security Council with resolution 
47/1, adopted on 22 September 1992.11 
While admission of a new member to the United Nations can be viewed as a rather uncomplicated 
issue of either yes or no through the procedure of article 4(2) of the UN Charter, the question 
of membership by way of continuation is subject to the constitutive theory of recognition.12 
That means that the Court had to infer an answer based on a highly politicized legal doctrine 
in stead of a codified legal procedure. In other words, whether or not a state is viewed as the 
continuator of a UN member is so to speak in the eye of the beholder. From the legal point of 
view this is evidently problematic when membership triggers legal consequences such as access 
to the Court, which is obviously intended to be interpreted in an objective sense: a state can 
exercise this capacity towards all other states or towards none. 
This posed a significant problem for the Court to resolve under article 35(1). How to identify the 
legal status when recognition is predominantly motivated by political considerations? As vice 
president Al-Khasawneh noted in his dissenting opinion to the Judgment on the merits, “This 
state of affairs is typical for the relativism inherent in the constitutive theory of recognition 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
10 UN Doc. S/RES/777 (1992).
11 […] 1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia […] cannot continue automatically the membership of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia […] should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the 
General Assembly: UN Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992).
12 The author is aware of the controversial status of the constitutive theory, but is in agreement with Vice-President Al-
Khasawneh that recognition in this case is best qualified as constitutive. supra note 13. 
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and in itself prevents the drawing of any firm inferences.”13 The uncertainty about the status 
of the FRY led Bosnia to ask for a legal explanatory statement from the Secretary-General on 
this matter. The Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the UN replied and took the 
view that:   
“While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue 
the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
the United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, the only 
practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia […] shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly. It is 
clear, therefore, that representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia […] 
can no longer participate in the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary 
organs, nor conferences and meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia’s 
membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate remain 
as before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia […] cannot sit behind the sign ‘Yugoslavia’. Yugoslav missions at 
United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to function and may 
receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue 
to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia used by 
the Secretariat. The resolution does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to 
participate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies. The admission 
to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will 
terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1”;14
Confronted with these seemingly contradictory views of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly on the one hand and the Secretary-General on the other hand, the Court noted in 
the Order of 8 April with a sense of understatement that “…while the solution adopted is not 
free from legal difficulties, the question whether or not Yugoslavia is a Member of the United 
Nations and as such a party to the Statute of the Court is one which the Court does not need 
to determine definitively at the present stage of the proceedings…”.15 It continued by stating 
that the other way to have access to the Court, namely a special provision contained in a treaty 
in force, could in this case be found in article IX of the Genocide Convention, which confers 
jurisdiction on the Court in case of disputes arising under the Convention, and can in any event 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
13  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 26 February 2007 (not yet published), Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-
Khasawneh, para. 8.
14 UN Doc. A/47/485 (1992); emphasis in the original.
15 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 6, para. 18.
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serve as a prima facie basis for the jurisdiction ratione personae. So without excluding access to 
the Court by way of membership to the United Nations, the Court seemed rather reluctant to 
take a clear stance on the matter and relied mainly on article 35(2) of the Statute. 
Not a single reference to the issue of access to the Court can be found in the Judgment on 
Preliminary Objections of 11 July 1996.16 One might expect a more firm position of the 
Court at this later stage of the proceedings, since in principle at this stage the jurisdictional 
and admissibility issues are decided upon with finality. But as the issue of access was not put 
forward by either party (at that time the FRY still held on to the claim that it was continuing 
the membership of the SFRY), the Court apparently saw no need to address it. According to 
Judge Tomka the attitude of the Court was the result from the objective ‘not to pre-empt (or 
pre-judge) the position that the Security Council and the General Assembly might have taken 
subsequently’,17 an explanation that reflects vice-presidents Al-Khasawneh’s remarks on the 
political nature of recognition. 
Hence, the Court rejected all raised objections and concluded that it had jurisdiction to proceed 
to the merits of the case. 
I.1 The Change of Strategy
In the aftermath of Milosevic’s fall from power and the emergency of a new spirit of democracy, 
the strategy of Serbia before the Court changed significantly.18 It decided to abandon its claim 
of continuation and applied for admission as a new member of the UN on 27 October 2000. 
Through the procedure of article 4 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly admitted the FRY 
as a member on 1 November 2000.19 Taking this new membership as the starting point, the FRY 
argued that it only became a member of the UN with the recent admission and consequently 
challenged membership before this date. For the present case that meant the withdrawal of the 
counterclaim that had earlier been launched and a request for revision of the decision rendered 
in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections.20 
In the Application for Revision case, the FRY basically argued that the admission had exposed 
unknown facts at the time of the judgment on preliminary objections, namely that the FRY was 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
16 Supra note 4.
17  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 26 February 2007 (not yet published), Separate Opinion Judge Tomka, para. 16.
18  This paragraph is largely based on the article of Maria Chiara Vitucci, ‘Has Pandora’s Box been Closed? The Decisions 
on the Legality of Use of Force Cases about the Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
within the United Nations’, Leiden Journal of International Law (19) 2006-1, p. 112.
19 UN Doc. A/RES/55/12.
20  The counterclaim contained a charge of genocide committed by Bosnia against Serbs: Applicution of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishrnent of the Crime of Genocide, Counter-claims, Order of 17 Decemher 1997, I. C. J. Reports 
1997, p. 243. In two other proceedings the FRY was involved with, the Legality of Use of Force cases and the Application 
of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro), it claimed not to be a member of the UN before the 
date of admission.  
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not a member of the UN and by implication was not bound by the Genocide Convention.21 The 
formal admission revealed this reality. The Court took a different view and considered that the 
admission in itself was not a new fact within the meaning of article 61 of the Statute, since it 
only took place after the date of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections.22 The admission also 
did not uncover a different reality pertaining to Serbia’s membership of the UN, as it “cannot 
have changed retroactively the sui generis position which the FRY found itself in vis-à-vis the 
United Nations over the period 1992 to 2000, or its position in relation to the Statute of the 
Court and the Genocide Convention.”23 In the diffuse situation that was created by General 
Assembly resolution 47/1, the precise effects, such as the consequence of non-participation in 
the work of the General Assembly, had to be determined on a case by case basis. It did however 
not “affect the FRY’s right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the 
Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute.”24 
Diffuse as the situation may have been, the Court concludes that the renewed admission was 
necessary to terminate the unclear situation produced by Resolution 47/1, but can not have 
altered the legal consequences of that Resolution in the period before the date of admission. As 
these facts were known to the Court and to the FRY at the time the Judgment was given, the 
conditions for admissibility had not been satisfied.25 Consequently, the Court did not have to 
pronounce explicitly upon the membership of the FRY of the UN, thereby leaving the previous 
Order on Provisional Measures still the only instance where the Court did so.
I.2 Access to the Court Revisited
The rejection of the request for revision did not satisfactorily nor finally decide the question 
of access to the Court. On the contrary, by virtue of the inadmissibility ruling and the 
subsequent effect that it had never been exhaustively addressed except on a provisional basis, 
the uncomfortable impression arises that the Court was reluctant to deal with it perhaps not on 
account of the unclear politicized status of membership, but because of its destructive potential 
to the Court’s jurisdiction. This suggestion became even more tangible with the delivery of 
the judgments in the Legality of the Use of Force cases. Under explicit protest of the minority 
by means of a joint declaration of seven out of 15 judges26, the majority ruled that “Serbia and 
Montenegro, at the time of the institution of the present proceedings, did not have access to the 
Court under either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of article 35 of the Statute”.27 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
21  Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Application instituting 
proceedings, 24 April 2001.
22  Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 
(Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p.7, paras. 68-70.
23 Idem, para. 71.
24 Idem, para. 70.
25 Idem, paras. 71-74.
26 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 5, Joint Declaration, paras. 10-12.
27 Idem, paras. 91 and 126.
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As commentators have already observed, the Court surprisingly abandoned its demonstrated 
position of self-restraint towards UN membership and followed the arguments of the parties 
including Serbia, by considering that Serbia was not a Member of the United Nations, and 
thus not a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing 
its Application.  At this point the Court explicitly departed from the findings in the Order on 
Provisional M28asures of 8 April 1993 and from the view held in the Revision case where it said 
that General Assembly Resolution 47/1 did not affect the right to appear for the Court. 
Problematic as these inconsistent and contradictory findings may be to the coherence and 
legitimacy of the Court’s jurisprudence, they do not affect the discretion of the Court in the 
Genocide case to rule otherwise on the same issue. In other words, the findings in the Legality 
and Revision cases do not constitute res judicata for the purpose of the Genocide case: once an 
issue has been decided, the principle embodied in articles 36 (6) and 60 of the Statute precludes 
a second ruling upon it. But this naturally has to be understood as confined to the context of a 
single case. Within this context, according to the Court, the decision in the meaning of article 
60 of the Statute can be given either expressly or by necessary implication.29 
Because of a written invitation of the Court itself ‘to present further arguments to the Court on 
jurisdictional issues during the oral proceedings on the merits’, the issue regarding the access 
to the Court,30 which is by nature a preliminary issue, became a contentious issue again in 
the merits phase. Thus the central question became whether the silence of the 1996 Judgment 
on Preliminary Objections should be interpreted as an implicit decision on the matter or no 
decision at all. In the Court’s view, the choice not to commit itself to a definite position on the 
legal status of the FRY does not signify a lack of awareness of the unclear legal situation at the 
time.31 Thus it should not be interpreted as having no opinion on the matter. On the contrary, 
the Court explicitly distances itself from the inference drawn in the Legality on the Use of Force 
cases that the admission uncovered the legal reality underlying the sui generis situation:
“As the Court here recognized, in 1999 - and even more so in 1996 - it was by 
no means so clear as the Court found it to be in 2004 that the Respondent was 
not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. The inconsistencies of 
approach expressed by the various United Nations organs are apparent from the 
passages quoted in paragraphs 91 to 96 above.”32 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
28  Vitucci 2006, supra note 18, on the position of self-restraint by the Court. See Simon Olleson for an analysis of 
the Legality cases, S. Olleson, ‘‘Killing Three Birds with One Stone’?, The Preliminary Objections Judgments of the 
International Court of Justice in the Legality of Use of Force Cases’, Leiden Journal of International Law (18) 2005-2. 
29  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 26 February 2007 (not yet published), para. 48. 
30 Idem, para. 82.
31 Idem, para. 130.
32 Idem, para. 131.
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The Court seems to indicate that the legal obscurity did not allow an unequivocal positive or 
negative finding on UN membership, but only a sui generis qualification, implying ‘something 
in between’. Apparently, it considered this qualification as a position on membership since it 
concludes that it has already positively decided on the issue of access to the Court. It states 
that in 1996 it found that Yugoslavia was bound by the Genocide Convention and that it had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute on the basis of Article IX.33 The Court continues 
by stating that:
“Since, as observed above, the question of a State’s capacity to be a party to 
proceedings is a matter which precedes that of jurisdiction ratione materiae, 
and one which the Court must, if necessary, raise ex officio (see paragraph 122 
above), this finding must as a matter of construction be understood, by necessary 
implication, to mean that the Court at that time perceived the Respondent as 
being in a position to participate in cases before the Court. On that basis, it 
proceeded to make a finding on jurisdiction which would have the force of res 
judicata. The Court does not need, for the purpose of the present proceedings, to 
go behind that finding and consider on what basis the Court was able to satisfy 
itself on the point. Whether the Parties classify the matter as one of “access 
to the Court” or of “ jurisdiction ratione personae”, the fact remains that the 
Court could not have proceeded to determine the merits unless the Respondent 
had had the capacity under the Statute to be a party to proceedings before the 
Court.”34 
 
This is a rather puzzling statement by the Court. On the one hand it stresses the importance of 
the issue of ‘access’ in that it should be raised ex officio if necessary, while on the other hand, it 
is prepared to accept ‘access’ as being implied in the affirmation of jurisdiction ratione materiae, 
without any reference to it or form of clarification. There seems to be, at least at a grammatical 
level, a tension between ‘raising’ and ‘implying’ in the sense that they are different standards. A 
complete silence on the topic does not seem consonant with the first, while under circumstances 
possible under the latter. With a matter of importance at stake as proclaimed by the Court itself, 
implication however does not seem an adequate method to decide within the meaning of article 
60 of the Statute. This approach reduces the element of access to the Court to a meaningless 
condition that is already met when jurisdiction ratione materiae is passed. Essentially the Court 
seems to say that if jurisdiction is passed, then it has jurisdiction, a demonstration of circular 
logic that does not convince. The conclusion of the Court that it could not have proceeded 
unless the FRY possessed that capacity makes the circle complete. One may argue that the 
Court should not proceed in that eventuality by failing a statutory requirement, but it certainly 
can: once the Court affirms jurisdiction ratione materiae, access to the Court has to be assumed 
and is not challengeable because of res judicata. The Court indeed seems to intend this logic:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
33 Idem, para. 132.
34 Ibid
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“The determination by the Court that it had jurisdiction under the Genocide 
Convention is thus to be interpreted as incorporating a determination that all 
the conditions relating to the capacity of the Parties to appear before it had been 
met.”35 
In this light the criticism of the judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma is understandable. In their 
dissenting opinion they state that:
“There is nothing in the 1996 Judgment indicating that the Court had definitely 
ruled on that issue in such a way as to confer upon it the authority of res judicata. 
An issue is not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata just because the Court 
says it is.”36  
They rightly link the principle of res judicata to article 56 of the Statute of the Court, by which 
the Court is bound to state the reasons on which it is based. It is essential to the legitimacy of 
the Court’s decisions that they are explained to and understood by the parties to facilitate the 
acceptance of the ruling. Moreover, it serves as a check on the quality of the reasoning that has 
been applied. Judge Tomka also expresses serious misgivings about the reasoning of the Court 
and explains in his separate opinion that he finds the construction of a decision ‘by necessary 
implication’ strained and not convincing.37 The Court thus might have ‘perceived’ the FRY as 
being capable of proceeding before the Court, but it did not appear to have given a decision on 
that issue. 
As a result, the only phase in the proceedings where it has been explicitly addressed is the Order 
of 8 April 1993. The precise legal basis on which the Court establishes its jurisdiction to proceed 
to the merits thus remains unspecified. For such a problematic issue, although contested only 
in the later stage of the proceedings, this solution of the Court is not quite satisfactory. The 
question is however what alternatives the Court had at its disposal. Not passing jurisdiction after 
proceedings of almost 13 years would have been virtually unacceptable in view of the elapsed 
time, the extreme gravity of the case and the interests at stake. An explicit pronouncement on 
access would imply contradicting the findings of the Court in the Legality on the Use of Force 
cases either on article 35 (1) or (2). In view of the seriousness of the case, a ruling on article 35 
(1) which would limit the leeway of the UN organs to decide otherwise, would seem to strike a 
fair balance of interests, particularly because of the lack of unanimity they displayed.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
35 Idem, para. 133.
36  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma, para. 3.
37  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 17, Separate 
Opinion Judge Tomka, para. 21.
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II. The Law
Having accepted jurisdiction, the Court could finally consider the international responsibility 
of Serbia under the Genocide Convention. In order to do that it first had to determine the 
scope and meaning of the relevant provisions. In case of the Genocide Convention that is 
not an uncomplicated matter. In this part first the particular structure of the Genocide 
Convention will be analyzed (II.1), followed by a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of 
the substantive obligations for States. The obligation not to commit genocide can be divided 
into the identification of the legal basis for such an obligation under the Convention (II.2), 
the corresponding nature of the responsibility for a violation of the obligation (II.3), the 
identification and application of the elements of a State perpetrated genocide (II.4), the issue of 
attributing genocide to the State (II.5) and the obligation not to commit through a participatory 
mode (II.6). After the obligations to prevent (II.7) and to punish(II.8), the issue of reparation 
shall be addressed(II.9).  
II.1 The Dual Structure of the Genocide Convention
As it stands, the Convention reflects the duality of international law in the sense that it imposes 
obligations on States as well as on individuals.38 A bird’s-eye view of the Convention learns 
that on the one hand, it instructs States to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide 
and to punish genocidal individuals, whereas on the other hand it includes provisions that 
proscribe the prohibited behavior of individuals amounting to the crime of genocide. This 
dichotomy between acts that can be exclusively committed by States and acts that can be 
exclusively committed by individuals is based on a fundamental difference in the nature of their 
responsibility. State responsibility under the Convention does not contain punitive elements 
and is best comparable with civil responsibility analogous to domestic law.39 For instance 
the procedure of the ICJ is based on principles such as party-autonomy and equality and in 
conformity with standard jurisprudence and customary international law only reparatory 
damages may be awarded. In contrast, individual responsibility as provided for under the 
Genocide Convention is of a criminal nature. It has to be established in a criminal procedure, 
which is characterized by coercive powers of the judge and prosecutor and potentially leads to 
the imposition of punishment. 
The different impact of both forms of responsibility on the legal position of the involved 
participants results in a distinction in norm addressees. The gravity of the criminal charge, 
the intensity of the investigational competences and procedures and the seriousness of possible 
penalties necessitate that this type of responsibility is exclusively attributed to individuals who 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
38 See John Quigley, The Genocide Convention : an international law analysis, Aldershot: Ashgate 2006, p. 73.
39  According to Special Rapporteur on State responsibility John Crawford, State responsibility is best characterized as an 
undifferentiated regime, ‘which does not embody such domestic classifications as ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’’, see J. Crawford 
and S. Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility’, in: Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 457-458. Yet he also argues that States are unwilling to insert any punitive 
element in the field of State responsibility, supra note 153, p. 36.
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are personally involved in the (alleged) criminal act. According to criminal doctrine this kind 
of responsibility, generally considered the ultimum remedium on the ground of its potentially 
extreme punitive character, cannot be allocated to persons who did not participate in the criminal 
act themselves.40 This basic tenet of criminal law is commonly referred to as the principle of 
personal guilt.41 As such it forms a major impediment to the criminalization of collectives as 
represented by legal persons such as States, since the personal guilt of each individual member 
of the collective will no longer be required, but ‘only’ the guilt of the legal person as such. 
Another obstacle for including the State as legal entity in criminal law is formed by the 
classical point of departure that criminal responsibility is tailor made for natural persons. It 
must necessarily be linked to a physical act or its omission by the person himself. In addition 
to this objective requirement (actus reus), it is a prerequisite that the perpetrator acts with a 
blameworthy mental capacity (mens rea). No act is considered to be criminal if the perpetrator 
did not intend the criminal act to occur. The combination of objective and subjective elements 
were long held to be the most solid guarantees that criminal responsibility would be limited to 
the actual perpetrator. 
It must be noted though that the validity of both traditional barriers of a dogmatic nature has 
been subject to serious erosion due to developments under both domestic and international 
criminal law. Under domestic law formal collectives as legal persons are to an increasing extent 
recognized as criminal actors and consequently incorporated as norm addressee in criminal 
codes.42 This phenomenon has not yet manifested itself in international criminal law.43 
Moreover, the requirement of a physical act is no longer sacrosanct in either domestic or 
international criminal law.44 This can be demonstrated by reference to article 25(3)(a) of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC), where the notion of co-
perpetration is provided for. It implies the acceptance of the idea that one person can be held 
criminally responsible for the physical act of another person. The criminal intention forms 
the more important part of the legal basis for responsibility. A similar understanding appears 
from the concept of perpetration by means, where the criminal mastermind is pointed out as 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
40  Particularly within the body of international criminal law concepts have been introduced and developed, which have 
stretched the meaning of participation. For a critical assessment see: Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, The 
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law, California Law Review (93) 2005, pp. 25-27.
41  For instance A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, pp. 136-139 or Elies van 
Sliedregt, The Criminal responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press 2003, pp. 5-6.
42  Hans de Doelder and Klaus Tiedemann, La criminalisation du comportement collectif: Criminal liability of corporations, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1996.
43  Research indicates that many domestic law systems have expanded the liability of legal persons to international norms, 
like the crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), while they are not obligated to do so, 
since the Rome Statute restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction to natural persons only. See: A. Ramasastry & R.C. Thompson, 
Commerce, Crime and Conflict, Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law, report 
of the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies.
44 Van Sliedregt 2003, supra note 41, p. 345.
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(intellectual) perpetrator.45 The concept of a joint criminal enterprise can be seen as a further 
development of a participatory mode where responsibility can be incurred without committing 
the main criminal act oneself in a physical sense.46 The fact that the body of international 
criminal law, as reflected by the ICC Statute, recognizes these notions shows that contemporary 
international criminal law increasingly accepts that a person can be criminally responsible 
without fulfilling the objective elements himself: they can be attributed. This development 
is an essential step with regard to a potential inclusion of legal entities into criminal law, 
although the issue of mens rea in this respect is still seen as an insurmountable barrier by some 
commentators.47 Attribution of the subjective elements to legal entities forms part of domestic 
concepts, but has not yet reached international criminal law.
The accrued pressure on the conventional barriers for the inclusion of legal persons in criminal 
law gains significance in light of the construction of the Genocide Convention. The Convention 
does not categorically exclude the possibility of the crime of genocide in the meaning of the 
Convention being committed by a State. Though through a grammatical interpretation it 
would most logically be constructed as prohibiting genocidal behavior of physical perpetrators, 
other interpretation methods might give different results. This is particularly so in the case of 
article IX, which confers jurisdiction on the Court for disputes “…including those relating to 
the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III…”. This 
element opens a window for the Court to accept that a State can be a perpetrator of genocide, 
but without any guidance on how to establish that fact in law or in procedure. As article IX is 
essentially a jurisdictional provision, it does not in itself establish any substantive obligations. 
The vagueness of article IX requires clarification by interpretation of the Court. If State-
perpetrated genocide is also prohibited by the Convention, does the convergence of the 
obligations of the State and the individual at this point, also mean a convergence of the elements 
required, the nature of the responsibility and the procedural standard? And what authority 
should be given to the decisions of a criminal tribunal, in this case the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: ICTY), particularly when it ruled upon the 
same factual events? As the Court did not exclude the possibility of genocide committed by a 
State in the meaning of the Convention in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections,48 and in 
light of the above mentioned developments in criminal law, these questions are no longer of a 
hypothetical nature.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
45 Idem, pp. 65-76.
46 Danner & Martinez 2005, supra note 40, and van Sliedregt 2003, supra note 41, pp. 100-101. 
47  Quigley 2006, supra note 38, p. 235, who refers to Schabas’s contention that the genocidal intent relates to the mind 
of a natural person. According to Schabas, this physical connotation rules out the possibility of responsibility of a State 
for genocide under the Convention.
48 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 4, para. 32.
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II.2 The Obligation Not to Commit Genocide
To answer these fundamental questions, the Court had to interpret the meaning of article IX 
in conjunction with the other provisions of the Convention, the purpose of the Convention 
and the intentions of the drafters. In this section the various aspects will be analyzed, that 
the Court had to address when interpreting the relevant provisions. In section 3.1 the possible 
consequences for the nature of responsibility will be discussed.   
The Court asserts that the “characterizations of the prohibition on genocide and the purpose 
of the Convention are significant for the interpretation of the second proposition stated in 
Article I … particularly in this context the undertaking to prevent”.49 Partly because of the 
purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose of the Convention, it concludes that the obligation 
to prevent in article I has an autonomous meaning, separate from the specifications in other 
provisions. Within this meaning, the Court quite boldly concludes, it must be understood to 
contain an obligation not to commit genocide, although the article does not expressis verbis 
formulate one.50 Though the topic was intensely debated at the negotiation stage, an explicit 
reference to this possibility had been omitted.51 Besides the logical assumption that upon the 
categorization of a certain act as a crime, States automatically undertake the obligation not 
to commit such an act themselves, the idea of the State as a potential perpetrator of genocide is 
also deemed implicit in the obligation to prevent. In the Court’s view, it evidently entails an 
obligation to refrain from committing it through the State’s own organs.52 Support for this 
liberal interpretation of article I in the Convention itself is found in the formulation of article 
IX, which states that:      
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to 
the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request 
of any of the parties to the dispute.” 
In light of the drafting history, the Court concludes that the phrase “including…article III” is 
inserted into the provision to confer jurisdiction to the Court in case of genocide committed by a 
State. Although support can be found in literature for this interpretation of the Court, it should 
not be taken for granted.53 As Judges Shi and Vereshchetin point out in their Joint Declaration 
to the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, any reference to the responsibility of a State for 
genocide was absent till the final stage of the negotiations.54 The drafting history reveals much 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
49  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 162.
50 Idem, para. 166.
51 See John Quigley on the specific background of the omission, Quigley 2006, supra note 38, pp. 222-226.
52  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 166.
53 See Quigley and the authors he refers to, Quigley 2006, supra note 38, pp. 228-229, pp. 238-239.
54  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 4, Joint declaration 
of Judge Shi and Judge Vereshcetin.
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uncertainty about the actual meaning of the article and the reference in particular.
The 1948 Genocide Convention should in this regard be situated in the historical context of 
the Nuremberg trials, which in a revolutionary fashion broke away from the traditional State 
responsibility by introducing the notion of individual criminal responsibility in international 
law. The primary motivation for this departure from classical State centered international law 
was to exclude the use of the State as a shield against the incurrence of international responsibility 
for the perpetration of international crimes. As explained above, the Convention is partly a 
penal Statute codifying the notion of individual criminal responsibility with regard to genocide 
(which did not constitute an autonomous crime in the Nuremberg jurisprudence), and partly 
a conventional treaty establishing responsibility for States. The State obligations were for the 
largest part of the negotiations aimed at effectuating the established individual responsibility by 
activating the cooperation of the State, and not framed as a prohibition to engage in genocidal 
activities itself. 
To a certain extent this attitude towards the crime of genocide seems logical in view of the 
position that individual criminal responsibility was given: no parallel interstate proceedings 
were instituted against the States constituting the axis powers. This appeared to suggest an 
exclusive position of individual responsibility in the field of international crimes, which seems 
reflected and arguably amplified by the much cited maxim of the International Military 
Tribunal (hereinafter: IMT),  at Nuremberg: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”55  
Yet this individualistic approach also completely fails to capture the involvement of the 
State authorities in the perpetration of the crime. As States must have been aware with the 
relatively recent holocaust in mind, genocide was hardly conceivable without the availability 
and employment of the State apparatus. The systematic nature of genocide requires either the 
acquiescence or active participation of the State, so the absence of any reference to this reality 
would be a serious flaw of the Convention.56 This provoked continued efforts of the UK to insert 
links to State responsibility in the provisions, but the associations with criminal responsibility 
in concept and language encountered resistance.57 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
55  Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, trial of the Major War Criminals, 1947, Official Documents, Vol. I, p. 
223.
56  Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention, A Commentary, New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs 1960, p. 101.
57 Quigley 2006, supra note 38, pp. 223-224.
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Although several delegations understood an act of genocide by a State or government to be 
implicitly covered by the Convention as violating the obligation to prevent and punish, the UK 
wanted an explicit basis for this.58 A joint amendment with Belgium ultimately led to success in 
that an explicit reference to the responsibility of the State, not just for the failure to prevent or 
punish, but for genocide itself was included in article IX. Judges Shi and Vereshchetin stressed 
that the amendment was accepted by a very small majority of 19 against 17 votes, with 9 
abstentions.59 There was also much confusion about the exact meaning of the provision, as 
several commentaries on the Convention describe.60 A later proposal was submitted to reverse 
the amendment, but was rebuffed.61 Apparently, the delegations were prepared to accept the 
notion of the State as perpetrator, but that willingness was limited to an expression in a vague 
jurisdictional provision instead of a substantive one.62 As one commentator observed, this 
peculiar outcome leaves the Genocide Convention to confer jurisdiction to the ICJ for an act 
that has not been described in the Convention itself.63   
The lack of specific provisions raises the obvious question what elements a genocide committed 
by a State might entail. The confusion among the negotiating parties about the meaning of 
article IX, shows that it was not automatically taken to correspond with the provisions defining 
genocide for the purpose of individual criminal responsibility. The question whether perpetrator 
ship of natural persons and States could be equated in law was never resolved. 
In response to the argument of Serbia that State responsibility is excluded in case of an 
international crime and the related unclear issue of the elements of a State perpetrated genocide 
under the Convention, the Court stresses that the maxim of the IMT should be understood in 
the proper meaning. It asserts that the IMT was countering the argument that international 
law did not provide for the punishment of individuals, but merely addressed the obligations 
of States.64 The IMT considered that international law imposed duties upon individuals as 
well as upon States. The Court observes that this duality of responsibilities can be found in 
several instruments of international law, such as the Statute of the ICC and the articles on State 
responsibility of the International Law Commission (hereinafter: ILC). It finds that nothing 
in the wording or structure of the Convention precludes the interpretation of the Court that 
article I, read in conjunction with article 3, imposes obligations on the State distinct from the 
obligations which the Convention requires them to place on individuals.65 It thus confirms the 
dual character of the Convention.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
58 Idem, p. 224.
59 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 54.
60 Quigley 2006, supra note 38, pp. 227-233, and Robinson 1960, supra note 56, pp. 101-102.
61  United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, Summary Records of the 
96th meeting, p. 355.
62 Quigley 2006, supra note 38, p. 224.
63 Idem, para. 224.
64  Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
29, para. 172.
65 Idem, para. 174.
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With regard to the elements of State perpetrated genocide, an issue on which the Convention 
is completely silent as explained above, the Court very briefly states that it must be shown 
that genocide as defined in the Convention has been committed.66 It thus indicates in very 
few words the far-reaching implication that it will apply the provisions containing criminal 
prohibitions to review the wrongfulness of State acts.67 It asserts that this does not require a prior 
criminal conviction of individuals by a criminal tribunal: the Court can make an autonomous 
determination on genocide. It finds that a criminal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite as it considers 
itself capable to deal with issues of ‘exceptional gravity’ under its Statute, without explaining 
which specific provisions enable it to this end. Otherwise the readily conceivable scenario of 
a State perpetrated genocide would result in a lack of legal redress in case no international 
penal tribunal is established: rulers are not likely to subject themselves to domestic criminal 
jurisdiction on charges of genocide.68 
Though laudable in its objective, this argumentation seems strained. In the recent case of Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the Court was confronted with facts of perhaps equal 
gravity considering the brutality and the shocking amount of casualties that the conflict in 
the Great Lake region produced, and found itself barred from adjudication by a reservation to 
article IX.69 It painfully demonstrated the discrepancy between the compulsory jurisdiction of 
criminal tribunals and the consent based jurisdiction of the Court in cases of equal gravity: in 
case of the latter, the gravity in itself bears no relation to the issue of jurisdiction. It therefore 
does not seem a consistent justification of the Court to refer to a legal gap in the protection of 
individuals to claim the competency to make an autonomous determination of genocide.70        
II.3 The Nature of the Responsibility for State Perpetrated Genocide
Quite obviously, the Court struggles with its position between the criminal law and the public 
international law domain. On the one hand it does not want to forfeit its competence to 
adjudicate extreme grave interstate disputes, even when criminal tribunals have been put into 
place to effectuate the individual criminal responsibility for the exact same configuration of facts. 
It manifestly considers that there is still a role to play even when the facts amount to criminal 
acts. However, since it does not possess a criminal jurisdiction, it has to treat the committed 
acts as treaty violations (and thus as international wrongful acts), and adapt its approach. Under 
domestic law, a criminal act can in principle establish both criminal and civil liability. They 
are not mutually exclusive, since they reflect different dimensions of blameworthiness.71 The 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
66 Idem, para. 180.
67 Supra note 159. 
68  Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
29, para. 182.
69  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 
Judgment of 3 February 2006. 
70  Idem, compare para. 64 in which the Court indicates that the ius cogens character of the norm of genocide cannot of 
itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court.   
71  This concurrence can even yield different outcomes, like in the extensively media-covered O.J. Simpson case where 
the suspect was acquitted in the criminal trial but held liable in a civil trial for the same facts, though more often a 
(successful) civil suit will follow upon a criminal conviction.
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Court is thus not legally precluded from establishing the ‘civil-like’ liability of a State, even 
though the facts have already been adjudicated by a criminal tribunal. The essential difference 
with concurrent civil and criminal responsibility under domestic law and this case is that the 
legal basis for civil proceedings is a civil provision containing a definition of a wrongful act. The 
judge concerned will not make a finding based on a criminal provision; that would practically 
place him upon the seat of the criminal judge. 
In casu, the shift in procedural guarantees is another notable difference with a domestic civil 
suit, since a civil court will never have to adapt the procedural standard to the gravity of the 
case: it only deals with wrongs containing a civil blameworthiness. Quite predictably, Bosnia 
argued that the normal standard of an alleged breach of treaty violations should apply. In a 
similar vein, Wedgwood argued that the standard of criminal proof ‘exceeds the demands of 
civil liability’.72 These positions negate the fact that it is not a civil blame the Court is trying to 
establish. By choosing the penal provisions as legal basis, it will by implication distil a clearly 
defined criminal blameworthiness in stead of a ‘mere’ civil blame. In order to reflect the gravity 
of the alleged international wrongful act of genocide (counter-intuitive as that qualification may 
sound) the Court wisely raises the standard of proof to ‘a high level of certainty appropriate 
to the seriousness of the allegation’.73 Referring to earlier case law, the Court holds that claims 
against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity require fully conclusive evidence.74 The 
need for a higher procedural standard in cases of extreme gravity is indicative of the increased 
importance the Court attaches to the aim of truth finding. In this respect the procedure obtains 
a more criminal-like character. As a result, one would expect that the seriousness of the violation 
will also be reflected in the remedy, if proven. It gives rise to the question of the actual nature of 
the responsibility for the perpetration of genocide.
On this point there seems to be consensus in literature that the drafting history reveals that 
criminal responsibility was ultimately not accepted by the majority of State parties.75 Firstly, 
the proposals suggesting such a concept were rejected and secondly, the UK representative 
explained that their proposed (and ultimately accepted) amendment containing the reference 
to States directly responsible for genocide was meant to be of a civil rather than a criminal 
nature.76 
The Court acknowledged that the intended nature of direct State responsibility by the drafters 
by stating that the international responsibility of a State ‘is quite different in nature from 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
72 See Wedgwood 2007, supra note 3.
73  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 172.
74 Idem, para. 209.
75  Quigley 2006, supra note 38, 230-233. Also William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2000, pp. 418-420.
76 United Nations doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 440.
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criminal responsibility’.77 But if the responsibility is not of a criminal nature, then why does the 
Court deem it necessary to adapt the standard of proof to reflect the extreme gravity of the case? 
Either the seriousness of the charge is considered so detrimental to the status of a State in the 
international community that a finding of a violation of genocide needs to be supported by a 
high procedural standard, or the remedy that can be imposed is of a potentially punitive nature. 
Since punitive damages have not yet found acceptance in international law, it might be assumed 
that the stigmatizing effect of an affirmative finding on genocide formed the main reason for 
the Court to abandon the normal procedural standard. Perhaps this can not be equated to 
genuine criminal responsibility, but it can be argued that it is apparently perceived of by the 
Court as containing a punitive element: the label of a genocidal perpetrator bears heavy on the 
standing of a State as a member of the international community.
II.4 The Elements of State Perpetrated Genocide
As the Court thus held that genocide committed by a State meant genocide as defined under 
the Convention, it accordingly had to base a finding of genocide on article II, which provides 
the definition of genocide.78 As any typical criminal law provision,79 it contains elements 
describing the physical behavior (objective) and elements describing the intent of the perpetrator 
(subjective). After reviewing the facts, the Court only finds genocide to be established with 
regard to Srebrenica. This section will briefly address the Court’s findings.    
With regard to the significance of the factual findings of the ICTY to the Court’s appreciation 
of the facts, the Court holds that they are considered as ‘highly persuasive’.80 The Court seemed 
to have little choice in this respect as the ICTY has substantial investigatory powers, consonant 
with its compulsory jurisdiction, and is thus much better equipped than the Court to find 
relevant evidence, in stead of having to rely on what the parties submit. Moreover, as noted 
before, its procedural guarantees are aimed at protecting the rights of the suspect to a certain 
minimum level, only allowing a conviction on the basis of proof that is considered ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’. The possibility of an erroneous verdict simply becomes even less acceptable 
when criminal responsibility can be incurred. In order to reduce this risk, the standard of proof 
is such as to attain an optimal degree of certainty on the reliability of the facts. It demonstrates 
the prominent position that truth finding is given within the context of a criminal procedure.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
77  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, paras. 167 jo 
178.
78  Article 2: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
79  It must be stressed though that since the Court does not possess a criminal jurisdiction, it is forced to treat the crime 
of genocide as a treaty violation and thus as an international wrongful act. 
80  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 223.
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As the Court adapted its standard of proof to a level that does not seem to differ significantly 
from the criminal law standard, but without the investigational potential of the ICTY to find 
evidence that actually meets this standard, it quite logically relies heavily on the ICTY’s factual 
findings concerning the atrocities committed in Bosnia between 1991-1995. In examining 
article 2 of the Convention, it considers that although the objective elements of paragraphs 
(a), (b) and (c) have been demonstrated to the required standard, the Court has been unable to 
make a finding of the subjective element of genocidal intent.81 The Court identifies two levels 
at which the genocidal intent of a State can be located: the level of the physical perpetrators 
and the level of the ‘’higher authority’.82 With regard to the first, it consistently refers to the fact 
that in none of the instances invoked by Bosnia other than the events in Srebrenica, the ICTY 
found that the accused acted with the required special intent. Thus since genocide had only 
been established in case of Srebrenica, the Court has little options but to follow this finding.    
With regard to the latter, the Court agreed with Bosnia’s argument that intent could also be 
found in the form of a consistent pattern of conduct which could only point to the existence 
of genocidal intent, or a general plan to commit genocide.83 Although the acceptance of the 
fact that genocidal intent can be inferred from other organs than exclusively from the actual 
physical perpetrators is a significant contribution to the law on State responsibility under the 
Convention, the effect on this case remains limited as the Court concludes that it has not 
been convincingly demonstrated.84 The Court thus finds that genocide under article 2 of the 
Convention has only been established with regard to the massacre following the take-over of 
Srebrenica.85  
II.5 Attributing the Genocide at Srebrenica: Serbia as Perpetrator?
 
After the finding of genocide in Srebrenica, the Court subsequently had to answer: whether 
these genocidal acts could be attributed to Serbia under the rules of customary international 
law of State responsibility (codified in the Articles on State Responsibility), so that Serbia as a 
State could be held responsible as a perpetrator of genocide. If answered negatively, the question 
would arise as: to whether Serbia had participated in the act of genocide in the modes described 
in article 3 (b) to (e), subject to the same rules of attribution.86 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
81 Idem, paras. 277-319-354. The Court refers to the objective elements as material elements. 
82 The Court does not explicitly mention the two levels in one paragraph, except for paragraph 376.
83  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, paras. 370-
371-373.
84  Idem, para. 376. If it would have been proved, the situations referred to in footnote 81 would have resulted in a 
determination of genocide. This contribution cannot address the complex issue of attribution of intent in depth for the 
sake of brevity. For a discussion of the matter see A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between individual responsibility and 
State responsibility in international law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (52) 2003, pp. 633-635.   
85  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, paras. 297-
376.
86  Article 3 (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d ) Attempt to 
commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide. 
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The Court first considered whether the physical perpetrators of the genocide were organs of the 
FRY in the meaning of article 4 of the Articles on State Responsibility (hereinafter: ASR). It 
states that “there is nothing that could justify an affirmative response to this question”.87 The 
participation of the FRY army in the massacres prior to Srebrenica notwithstanding, there was 
no evidence of direct participation in relation to the events in Srebrenica in the Court’s view. In 
response to the claim of Bosnia that the officers in the VRS, including general Mladić, remained 
under FRY administration, and that among others their salaries were paid from Belgrade right 
up to 2002, making them de jure organs, the Court states that it has not been proven that 
Mladić was one of the officers that was administrated in Belgrade.88 Furthermore:
“[…] and even on the basis that he might have been, the Court does not consider 
that he would, for that reason alone, have to be treated as an organ of the FRY 
for the purposes of the application of the rules of State responsibility. There is 
no doubt that the FRY was providing substantial support, inter alia, financial 
support, to the Republika Srpska (cf. paragraph 241 above), and that one of 
the forms that support took was payment of salaries and other benefits to some 
officers of the VRS, but this did not automatically make them organs of the 
FRY.”89 […]
The Court explains that article 4 is intended to cover situations where the entities making up 
the State are supposed to act on its behalf. This is not to say that ultra vires acts are not covered, 
clearly they are in conjunction with article 7. But the functions of the VRS officers, including 
Mladić, were to act on behalf of the Bosnian Serb authorities and “exercised elements of the public 
authority of the Republika Srpska”.90 
This finding does not digest very well. The Court rather easily dismisses the possibility of article 
4 based on a purely formal distinction between the interests of Serbia and Republika Srpska, 
while the whole case revolves around the convergence of the interests.91 The very unusual 
situation that officers of an army of an autonomous entity in a neighbouring country are formally 
administrated by a State, even years after the formal and internationally accepted secession, is 
more akin to a contrary conclusion. If anything, it suggests that the interests are identical, 
otherwise Belgrade could and certainly would have stopped the payment of salaries, the decisions 
on promotion and pensions etc. The continuation essentially constitutes a formal relationship 
of employment: Serbia is the formal employer of the officers who are administered in Belgrade. 
It seems to fall under the scope of article 4 where ‘organ of the State’ should be interpreted in 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
87  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 386..
88 Idem, para. 388. The administration also covered pensions and promotions.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91  See the Strategic Goals document, supra note 4, para. 371. Vice-President Al-Khasawneh states in his dissenting 
opinion that the approach of the Court does not adequately take into account situations of a common criminal 
purpose (para. 39).
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a general sense.92 The Court considers salaries as a form of financial aid, but a distinction for 
the sake of identifying the proper grounds for attribution seems warranted between the acts of 
financial support and salaries. Whereas the first is relevant to the determination of the status of 
a de facto organ, the latter seems much more at place for an assessment of a de iure status. 
The Court was also unable to find the “Scorpions”, a paramilitary militia composed by mostly 
Serbs, to be a de iure or de facto organ of Serbia.93 It did not consider two intercepted documents 
which referred to the Scorpions as “a unit of the Ministry of Interiors of Serbia” sufficient proof 
to establish a formal link as neither of these communications was addressed to Belgrade. 
In a reference to the Nicaragua case, the Court also held that there is no evidence to assume a de 
facto status of the Scorpions under article 4. The applicable standard for establishing this status 
of “complete dependence” would require their characterization as mere instruments, whereas 
the Court explains that the Republika Srpska and the VRS were under leadership that ‘had 
some qualified, but real, margin of independence’.94 
The Court then addresses the question whether the massacres of Srebrenica were committed 
under the instructions or direction or control of FRY organs. It asserts that the customary rule 
as laid down in article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility should be read in conjunction 
with the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly the Nicaragua case. Accordingly it holds that for 
the attribution of acts of persons who can not be equated with State organs:  
“It must however be shown that this “effective control” was exercised, or that the 
State’s instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged 
violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the 
persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.”95 
At this point the Court explicitly departs from the standard of control as used by the ICTY in 
the Tadic case. In this case the Appeals Chamber found the Nicaragua test of effective control 
‘unpersuasive’, and opted for the less strict overall control test. This requires: 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
92  Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Commentaries article 4, p. 
95 under 6.
93  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 389.
94 Idem, para. 394.
95 Idem, para. 400.
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“[…] that the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping 
and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general 
planning of its military activity. Only then can the State be held internationally 
accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in 
addition, the State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, 
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law.”96  
The Court in turn discards with the overall control standard with the similar qualification of 
‘unpersuasive’ by observing that the overall control test would stretch the connection which 
must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility almost 
to the breaking point.97 It holds that a State is only responsible for its own conduct. This is a 
fundamental principle of criminal law, as explained in section 3. Under civil or tort law however 
it is not of the same stature. The Court thus applies a strict standard with regard to attribution 
of State responsibility, one that seems more restrictive than strictly necessary for responsibility 
of a non-criminal nature. In this regard the Court’s approach is consistent with the adopted 
standard of proof. The Court is only prepared to accept the perpetrator ship of a State for 
genocide in relation to acts of non-State organs in case of instructions given, direction provided 
or effective control over the acts by State organs.
Though criticized by commentators, once the Court opts for approaching the charge of genocide 
as something transcending the seriousness of a common interstate dispute, the choice for the 
effective control standard is a logical one. Under both standards a substantial involvement of 
the State is required, but the basic difference is that under the overall control standard the 
‘controlled’ group is not told what to do. It is ‘merely’ assisted (be it to such an extent that the 
commission of the wrongful act would perhaps not have been possible without it). It seems 
reasonable to qualify this involvement as complicity rather than perpetrator ship.98 Only if it 
can be proven that the State acted as the mastermind or initiator of the acts, then attribution 
will be possible under the effective control standard. 
In casu, the Court found that it has not been proved that the FRY has issued instructions with 
regard to the massacres at Srebrenica. Neither the report of the Secretary-General, The Fall of 
Srebrenica,99 nor the report of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation Srebrenica – a 
“safe” area100 and the CIA report Balkan Battlegrounds101 contained evidence of control by the 
FRY. Hence the Court concludes that “the decision to kill the adult male population of the 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
96 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 131.
97  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 406.
98  This distinction in perpetrators and accomplices is consistent with the predominant practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
See van Sliedregt, supra note 41, p. 62 and 74.   
99  See: http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf : Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General. Assembly 
resolution 53/35.
100 See: http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/.
101  The Central Intelligence Agency, Page 3, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, 
Washington: CIA Office of Public Affairs 2002.
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Muslim community in Srebrenica was taken by some members of the VRS Main Staff, but 
without instructions from or effective control by the FRY”.102 Thus Serbia can not be considered 
to be the perpetrator of the genocide at Srebrenica, as the acts of the physical perpetrators can 
not be attributed to it.
II.6 The State as an Accomplice?
It is important to realize that the Court did not create a gap in legal responsibility with the 
adherence to the effective control standard. The involvement not meeting the standard of article 
8 could still lead to international responsibility under the alternative modes of responsibility 
provided for in the Genocide Convention. With regard to the conspiracy to commit genocide 
the Court holds that this option is ruled out since it already established that the physical 
perpetrators of the genocide at Srebrenica did not qualify as FRY organs or persons acting under 
its control. With regard to the direct and public incitement to commit genocide, the Court 
states that there is clearly a lack of precise and incontrovertible evidence.103 
The Court then turns to the question whether Serbia can be qualified as an accomplice in the 
massacres. In order to define the scope of the notion of complicity; the Court first determines 
the objective elements and stresses that the issuing of orders or instructions will under certain 
national systems be qualified as complicity, but in the context of international responsibility 
for genocide, such acts will lead to direct responsibility of the State. Complicity, in the Court’s 
view, should be understood as to include the provision of means to enable or facilitate the 
commission of the crime.104 It should be interpreted in a sense not significantly differing from 
those concepts already accepted in the general law of State responsibility, particularly article 16. 
This article codifies the customary rule that aid or assistance by a State to another State in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act generates the international responsibility of the 
aiding State, if the State does so with knowledge of the wrongfulness. This rule is preferred over 
the notion of complicity as developed and clarified over the last decade by the ad hoc tribunals 
in the field of criminal law, despite the fact that the genocide is committed by a non state entity. 
Strictly, the rule does not apply. 
Following the criminal law definition on the other hand would entail the risk of making the 
obligation to prevent superfluous. Under the criminal law notion of complicity one can be an 
accomplice to a criminal act by omission.105 As the Court stipulates, the ‘mere failure to adopt 
and implement suitable measures to prevent genocide from being committed’, is already covered 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
102  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 413.
103 Idem, para. 417. 
104 Idem, para. 419.
105 Van Sliedregt 2003, supra note 41, p. 91.
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by the obligation to prevent.106 It already interpreted this obligation to be an autonomous one, 
in addition to the other articles which might be seen as specifications. Interpreting complicity 
as also encompassing acts of omission would subsume to a large extent the substantive meaning 
of the obligation to prevent under article 1 it had just acquired by the Court’s reading. The 
Court thus interprets the Convention to establish positive and negative obligations, the duty to 
prevent belonging to the first kind and article 3 as a provision containing prohibited behavior as 
a reflection of the latter. However, one might ask the question whether there are any compelling 
arguments for such a rigid division besides a systematic one. It seems to be at odds with the 
reasoning of the Court in relation to article I where the Court argued that the obligation to 
prevent should be understood as to implicitly contain an obligation not to commit. The choice 
for this artificial separation between positive and negative obligations seems somewhat arbitrary, 
but it has a direct effect on the issue of reparation in a later stage of the Judgment.
With regard to the subjective elements, it holds that the accomplice should at least be aware 
of the genocidal intent of the principal perpetrator.107 After considering the facts, the Court 
affirms the fulfillment of the objective elements, but considers the subjective element absent:
“There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in Srebrenica were committed, at 
least in part, with the resources which the perpetrators of those acts possessed as 
a result of the general policy of aid and assistance pursued towards them by the 
FRY. […] it is not established beyond any doubt in the argument between the 
Parties whether the authorities of the FRY supplied - and continued to supply 
- the VRS leaders who decided upon and carried out those acts of genocide with 
their aid and assistance, at a time when those authorities were clearly aware that 
genocide was about to take place or was under way;”108 
As a result, Serbia can not be considered to be an accomplice to the genocide that was committed 
in Srebrenica.
II.7 The Obligation to Prevent
With regard to the obligation to prevent the Court is once again confronted with an ear 
deafening silence in the Convention on how to interpret this principle. Judge Tomka notes in 
his separate opinion that the debate in the Sixth Committee was “not very illuminating”. He 
refers in apparent agreement to the observations of William Schabas regarding this silence:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
106  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 4, para. 432.
107 Idem, para. 421.
108 Idem, para. 422.
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“Not surprisingly the leading author on genocide wrote that “[p]erhaps the 
most intriguing phrase in Article I is the obligation upon States to prevent and 
punish genocide”. He continued that: “while the final Convention has much to 
say about punishment of genocide, there is little to suggest what prevention of 
genocide really means. Certainly, nothing in the debates about Article I provides 
the slightest clue as to the scope of the obligation to prevent.”109 
Thus the Court is forced to develop the criteria which enable an assessment of the scope of the 
obligation. First it notes that the nature of the obligation is one of conduct: if the State manifestly 
failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might 
have contributed to preventing the genocide, it incurs responsibility.110 In this regard the notion 
of due diligence is of critical importance according to the Court. The assessment needs to be 
performed on a case by case basis on the basis of the following parameters:     
“The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity 
to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already 
committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the 
geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and 
on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between 
the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s 
capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that 
every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen 
thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal 
position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of 
genocide.”111  
The first criterion requires a factual link of a certain substance between the ‘preventing’ State 
and the persons likely to commit the genocide. This criterion seems to express the normative 
aspect that States in a special position towards the ‘genocidals’ have an increased responsibility 
and should act on that. The actual meaning of the second criterion is less clear due to its vague 
description. The Court does seem to apply this criterion in the subsequent consideration of the 
facts, when it notes that the FRY was bound by very specific obligations by virtue of the two 
Orders indicating provisional measures. The Court ordered the FRY to take all measures within 
its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide, and in particular to ensure that 
no acts of genocide as prohibited by the convention, are committed by armed units under its 
control, direction or influence. With regard to other relevant legal facts, one might perhaps 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
109  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 17, Separate 
Opinion Judge Tomka, para. 66. For a similar view see Peter Quayle, ‘Unimaginable Evil: The Legislative Limitations 
of the Genocide Convention’, International Criminal Law Review (5) 2005, p. 367.
110  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 430.
111 Idem, para. 430.
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be inclined to think of specific obligations by virtue of membership of a (regional) collective 
security organisation, treaties specifying military assistance and other legal obligations that are 
particular to the legal relationship between the ‘preventing’ State and the ‘genocidals’. 
The absence of a position of genuine influence does not absolve a State from responsibility, in 
so far as it claims that it could not have prevented the commission of genocide, even if it would 
have applied its full capability within the confines of international law. In the Court’s view, 
the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might 
succeed in preventing the genocide from occurring, where the State acting in isolation would 
be unlikely to succeed.112  
The Court also stipulates an important difference with complicity with regard to the required 
standard of knowledge. The obligation to prevent is violated if ‘…the State was aware, or should 
normally have been aware of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed’.113 
Thus the State should act from the moment this danger emerges. As the degree of seriousness 
is not explained, this standard can still be applied restrictively, but it is without doubt fulfilled 
sooner than the strict requirement of knowledge of the genocidal intentions of another State 
or entity.  
This lowered standard of knowledge proved decisive for the incurrence of responsibility of 
Serbia under the Convention. The political, military and financial links between the FRY and 
the Bosnian Serbs were so close that a position of influence, unlike any other State party to 
the Convention, could be considered to be present. Moreover, as already indicated above, the 
FRY was under a legal obligation by the Court Orders to ensure that genocide would not be 
committed by anyone under its control or influence. Since both the factual and legal position of 
the FRY towards the Bosnian Serbs justify a higher degree of diligence and thus the imposition 
of specific positive obligations with regard to the prevention of genocide, the question of 
awareness of the intentions of the Bosnian Serbs seems already partially answered. In the 
context of such a close relationship at the political and military level, the Court concludes that 
Serbia must have been aware of a serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica. It relies heavily upon a 
statement that Milosevic allegedly made to General Wesley Clark during the negotiation of the 
Dayton Agreement, containing a warning of Milosevic to Mladić about the killing of people 
in Srebrenica. This allegation was denied by Milosevic, but used by the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTY in the rejection of a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.114 The Court further refers to ‘all 
the international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica’, and concludes that 
since Serbia has not shown that it took any initiative or action to prevent the genocide, Serbia 
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112 Idem, para. 430.
113 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 432.
114 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 16 June 2004, para. 280.
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has violated its obligation to prevent under the Convention and hence incurs international 
responsibility.115  
II.8 The Obligation to Punish
Article VI deals with the question who should punish the alleged genocidal perpetrators. 
It provides two options: either the competent tribunals of the State on whose territory the 
genocide occurred shall try the suspects, or an international penal tribunal. While at the time 
of the drafting of the Convention, the establishment of an international penal tribunal was 
more of an ideal then an imminent development, the Court considers that the ICTY definitely 
constitutes a penal tribunal in the meaning of article VI.116 Though an obligation to co-operate 
with such a tribunal seems a logical consequence, it is not expressly stipulated by the article, and 
the Court derives such an obligation without precisely indicating how. It merely considers that 
an obligation to co-operate with such a tribunal under article VI ‘is certain’ once the tribunal 
has been established.117  
It finds that this obligation is violated by the non-compliance of the State authorities before 
the regime change in 2000, and from 2000 by the irregular residence of Mladić, indicted for 
genocide, “…without the Serb authorities doing what they could and can reasonably do to 
ascertain exactly where he is living and arrest him…”.118 The Court also points to the Serbian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who stated that “…the intelligence services of that State knew 
where Mladić was living in Serbia, but refrained from informing the authorities competent to 
order his arrest because certain members of those services had allegedly remained loyal to the 
fugitive…”.119 Consequently, the obligation to punish under the Convention is violated.
II.9 The Issue of Reparation
Finally the Court has to address the question of appropriate reparation for the failure to comply 
with the obligations to prevent and to punish under the Convention. As restitution is evidently 
impossible, the Court examines whether compensation is appropriate.120 According to the 
Court a direct and certain causal relation must be established between the wrongful act and 
the damage sustained. 
Such a nexus could be considered established only if the Court were able to 
conclude from the case as a whole and with a sufficient degree of certainty that 
the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if the Respondent 
had acted in compliance with its legal obligations.121 
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Not surprisingly, the Court comes to a negative answer. It states that it clearly can not do so, as it 
has not been shown that the genocide would have been prevented if Serbia would have fulfilled 
its obligation to prevent. In light of the earlier assessment of the Court that the relationship 
between the Bosnian Serbs who physically perpetrated the genocide at Srebrenica and the FRY, 
was not characterized by effective control, but ‘only’ by a position of influence, this does not 
seem an unreasonable conclusion. However, the absence of causality is directly related to the 
qualification of the wrongful act as an act of omission. The proper sine qua non test in case of 
omission would indeed be the hypothetical question: would the damage resulting from the acts 
of genocide not have occurred if Serbia would have fulfilled its obligation to prevent?122 Only 
if the answer is affirmative, then a causal link is established. This is a very strict test, because 
hypothetically speaking it is hard to exclude other factors which could enable the genocidal acts 
to happen. Nevertheless support might still be found for an affirmative answer. As the Court 
found when it analyzed the relationships between the different entities involved:
“The Court finds it established that the Respondent was thus making its 
considerable military and financial support available to the Republika Srpska, 
and had it withdrawn that support, this would have greatly constrained the options 
that were available to the Republika Srpska authorities.”123 
Also relevant in this respect is the reference of Judge Keith in the context of complicity, to the 
statement of the Bosnian Serb president Karadzic before the Assembly of the Republika Srpska 
in May 1994: “[w]ithout Serbia nothing would have happened, we don’t have the resources 
and would not have been able to make war”.124 It should be borne in mind that the former 
Yugoslavia was under a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment from 1991 by resolution of the Security Council.125 
The problem with the inevitably hypothetical causality in the event of an act of omission is 
that an absolute certain answer is virtually impossible, thereby making a causal relationship 
improbable. A more serious point however is that it should be questioned if the Court was 
right in treating the obligation to prevent as an act of omission. This qualification stems from 
the division between positive and negative obligations in the Convention as further explained 
in section 4.3 below, which was not strictly necessary. At this point there is an important 
contradiction in the Court’s reasoning. As it held with regard to the interrelationship between 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
122  See for causality in law in general with regard to omission H.L.A. Hart & T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press 1985, pp. 127-128, for international criminal law Michael Duttwiler, ‘Liability for Omission 
in International Criminal Law’, International Criminal Law Review (6) 2006, pp. 6-7, for international law Francois 
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123  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 241.
124  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, Declaration 
of Judge Keith, para. 8.
125 UN Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
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the obligations not to commit genocide itself (article 3 a), not to engage in the participatory acts 
(article 3 b-e), and to prevent genocide:
“If a State is held responsible for an act of genocide [...] or for one of the other 
acts referred to in Article III of the Convention […] then there is no point in 
asking whether it complied with its obligation of prevention in respect of the 
same acts, because logic dictates that a State cannot have satisfied an obligation to 
prevent genocide in which it actively participated.”126 
The same reasoning led to the identification of an implicit obligation not to commit genocide as 
contained by article I. And yet there is no reference to the illegal activities of supplying arms to 
the Bosnian Serbs by the FRY. In the context of complicity, the Court considered that although 
awareness of the genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serbs by the FRY could not be proved, the aid 
and assistance was not doubted: 
“There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in Srebrenica were committed, at 
least in part, with the resources which the perpetrators of those acts possessed 
as a result of the general policy of aid and assistance pursued towards them by 
the FRY.”127 
In conjunction with its finding on the significance of the FRY’s support to the Bosnian Serbs, 
it can thus be inferred from the Court’s own findings that the genocide was at least partly 
committed with resources that the FRY supplied in contravention with the legally binding 
Orders of 1993.128 Though the Court never clarified the concrete actions Serbia could and 
should have taken to comply with the obligation to prevent, it seems an inescapable conclusion 
that at the minimum it should have stopped supplying the armed forces that were the principal 
candidates for the commission of a possible genocide. As argued before, there is no compelling 
logic in persisting in a strict division between acts of omission and commission, particularly 
in light of the above mentioned reasoning of the Court. In a reference to the Court’s own 
words, it should be concluded that Serbia did not satisfy its obligation to prevent as it actively 
participated in its facilitation. 
This analysis forces to reformulate the sine qua non test of causality into the sine qua non test 
that is applied for establishing causality for acts of commission, so as to take into account the 
aid and assistance provided by Serbia. Withdrawal of the support of resources does not exclude 
the possibility that the genocide would have materialized in any event, but such an application 
of a sine qua non relationship seems to present a too heavy burden of proof, and possibly even 
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126  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 382.
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128  It should be noted that the obligation imposed by the Orders aims to protect the same norm, namely the prohibition 
of genocide, as the norm where upon the obligation to prevent is based. The damage claimed by Bosnia is directly 
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an incorrect one. As Serbia is not under an obligation of result to prevent genocide or found to 
be a perpetrator of genocide itself, it should not be asked if the genocide in its entirety could 
have been averted, but if the damage resulting from the genocidal acts is (partly) caused by the 
failure of Serbia to comply with its obligation to prevent (by discontinuation of the supplies). 
The answer to this more appropriate question would have been affirmative. 
The current approach of the Court raises the question whether the obligation to prevent, which 
will only come into play after effective control can not be established, can ever generate financial 
compensation. Since the Court has ruled that responsibility under this obligation can not be 
averted by a claim that the genocide could not have been prevented even if all the means at the 
disposal of the State were employed, this category encompasses candidate offenders where the 
causal relationship between the failure to act and the alleged damages will be very hard to prove. 
The only reparation the Court deems appropriate is satisfaction in the form of the ‘declaration 
in the present Judgment that Serbia has failed to comply with the obligation imposed by the 
Convention to prevent the crime of genocide’.129  
With regard to the failure to punish, the Court also considers the declaration of the failure in 
the operative part of the Judgment to be sufficient satisfaction. As the non-compliance with 
the duty to co-operate is still continuing, the Court includes a declaration in which it demands 
that Serbia shall immediately take effective steps to ensure the full co-operation with the ICTY, 
including the transfer of individuals accused of genocide or other acts for trial by the ICTY.130  
III. Implications of the Judgment
Although article 59 of the Statute states that the decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties, the significance of this Judgment clearly transcends the particularities of 
the case. First of all, the Court had to clarify the obligations for States under the Convention, 
since these proceedings where the first to revolve around allegations of genocide by a State. 
The Judgment thus states the prevailing interpretation of the obligations of all States-parties. 
Secondly, various issues of international law played a central role in this case. A few of them 
might be influenced or further developed by the relevant considerations of the Court. In the 
next two sections, some general implications with regard to the extraterritorial scope of the 
Convention and the concept of crime of State will be discussed.131 
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III.1 The Extra-Territorial Implications of the Judgment
Extra-territoriality is obviously a central theme in the Genocide case, since it basically revolves 
around the question of international responsibility under the Genocide Convention of Serbia 
for genocide committed on the territory of Bosnia. This is not a particularity of this case; the 
extra-territorial dimensions of genocide have also been subject to extensive debate during the 
negotiations of the Convention.132 The Secretary-General was of the opinion that the purpose 
of the Genocide Convention required the universality of repression. In his view, and that of 
experts, General Assembly resolution 96, affirming genocide as a crime under international 
law and calling for a draft convention by the ECOSOC, should be properly understood as to 
embrace such a principle. The Ad Hoc Committee though, as one of the many organs involved 
in the drafting process, removed any reference to universal jurisdiction, mainly because it found 
the universality principle to be an infringement on the principle of sovereignty. This danger 
remains of significance, particularly with regard to the obligation to prevent. The issue was also 
debated in the Sixth Committee and ultimately rejected by a vote of 29 to 6, with 10 abstaining. 
According to the commentary to the Convention by Nehemiah Robinson, the omission of this 
principle leads to the interpretation that under the Convention, genocide can only be dealt with 
by the State on whose territory the genocide is committed and by organs of the UN.133    
In the proceedings of the case, the question of the extra-territorial scope of the Convention 
was first addressed in the preliminary phase. In response to a preliminary objection against the 
extra-territorial application of the Convention, the Court had stated that:
“It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights 
and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that the obligation each State thus 
has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by 
the Convention.”134   
This already deviates from the assessment of Robinson at the time of the conclusion of the 
Convention. But the question arises whether the finding is endowed with the authority of 
res judicata. In the Court’s view, this finding pertained only to article I. Since it did not rule 
on each particular obligation arising under the Convention, it says it still has to rule on the 
territorial scope of the Convention. It does so in the following paragraphs:
The substantive obligations arising from Articles I and III are not on their face limited by 
territory. They apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate 
to meeting the obligations in question. The extent of that ability in law and fact is considered, 
so far as the obligation to prevent the crime of genocide is concerned, in the section of the 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
132 See for this discussion Robinson 1960, supra note 56, p. 31.
133 Idem, p. 32.
134 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 4, para. 31.
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Judgment concerned with that obligation (cf. paragraph 430 below). The significant relevant 
condition concerning the obligation not to commit genocide and the other acts enumerated in 
Article III is provided by the rules on attribution (paragraphs 379 ff. below).135
The obligation to prosecute imposed by Article VI is by contrast subject to an express territorial 
limit. The trial of persons charged with genocide is to be in a competent tribunal of the State in 
the territory of which the act was committed (cf. paragraph 442 below), or by an international 
penal tribunal with jurisdiction (paragraphs 443 ff. below). 
 
What is noticeable at first sight is that any reference to the erga omnes character of the rights 
and obligations contained in the Convention as a foundation for extraterritoriality is absent. The 
extent to which the obligations have extra-territorial effect is now differentiated per obligation. 
With respect to the obligation for States not to commit genocide the normal rules of attribution 
determine whether an act of genocide outside a State’s territory can generate international 
responsibility under the Convention. This issue will thus be decided on the basis of existing 
customary law. The obligation not to commit genocide also entails the prohibited engagement 
in the participatory modes enumerated in article 3 (b)-(e). Complicity, conspiracy, incitement 
and the attempt to commit genocide are however factually and legally hard to conceive of as not 
raising responsibility under the general law on State responsibility. Such behaviour would at the 
minimum be considered a violation of the principle of non-intervention or of State sovereignty. 
Although innovative in the law on State responsibility, they do not seem to extend the extra-
territorial application of the Convention any further.   
As for the obligation to punish, specifically dealt with in article VI, the Court indicates that it 
is strictly territorial. Since the genocide was committed outside Serbia’s territory, the obligation 
to punish is not engaged in this respect (of course, the residence of Mladić on Serbia’s territory 
did constitute a violation of the duty to co-operate, an implicit part of the obligation to punish). 
The Court observes that while the Convention does not oblige States to exercise extra-territorial 
criminal jurisdiction, it also does not prohibit States to do so either, subject to compatibility 
with international law, particularly if based upon the principle of active personality.136 In this 
approach the Court follows the conventional reading of the Genocide Convention, such as 
supported by Robinson.  
The system as laid down in article VI of territorial obligations for individual States parties 
complemented by an enforcement mechanism at the international level of the UN to only deal 
collectively (via an international penal tribunal) with genocide outside one’s territory, is not 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
135  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, paras. 183-
184.
136 Idem, para. 442.
137  For an assessment see G. Molier, ‘Het Internationaal Gerechtshof, Srebrenica en het Genocide-Verdrag: rechtsvinding 
of rechtsschepping’, Vrede en Veiligheid (36) 2007- 1, pp. 20-22.
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fully copied by the Court in its approach to the obligation to prevent. Though article VIII seems 
to envisage a similar division, the Court interprets the obligation to prevent as to also oblige 
individual States to prevent genocidal acts outside the perimeters of their own territories. 
The criterion formulated by the Court ‘wherever it may be acting or may be able to act’ seems 
to stretch the extra-territorial application of the Convention far beyond the standard of control, 
as advocated by Serbia in their memorial.  However, the seemingly unlimited scope is restricted 
by the limits implicit in the due diligence test, which has already been explained above. This test 
yields a differentiated regime of responsibility that varies with the differing relationships between 
the States parties and the ‘genocidals’. This assessment in concreto is a first safeguard against 
a too extensive scope of the obligation. Within the diligence test further restrictions are built 
in. For instance, the geographical distance from the scene of events is a factual circumstance 
which may negatively affect the capacity to influence. It is also less likely that intense political or 
cultural ties can be sustained with a State on another continent for example, though exceptions 
are certainly possible.138  
Another restriction, of a legal nature, is that every State may only act within the limits permitted 
by international law. Unless the Court is of the opinion that humanitarian interventions are 
legal under (customary) international law, a question that it always seems to have avoided, this 
condition excludes military interventions on the basis of article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as 
lawful measures adopted to meet the positive obligation to prevent genocide. A less clear issue is 
at what point the obligation to prevent may be considered to impede upon the principle of non-
intervention. As this principle prohibits the intervention in a State’s internal or external affairs 
by another State, the options for preventative measures seem very limited. Moreover, measures 
addressing a situation that can develop into genocide seem most effective at the collective level. 
The Court seems to modestly hint at such an approach:
“[…] the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several 
States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the 
result - averting the commission of genocide - which the efforts of only one State 
were insufficient to produce.”139 
Such an interpretation would be consistent with the positive obligations that States are under 
according to the regime of the articles on State responsibility in case of a ius cogens violation, to 
which category genocide clearly belongs. Article 41 (1) ASR codifies this consequence.
States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the 
meaning of article 40.140  
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
138 For instance, in many cases former colonies maintain close relations with the former colonial powers. 
139 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 430.
140 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).
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With regard to the kind of measures that States should take, the commentaries note the 
following:
 
“What is called for in the face of serious breaches is a joint and coordinated 
effort by all States to counteract the effects of these breaches. […] But in fact 
such cooperation, especially in the framework of international organizations, is 
carried out already in response to the gravest breaches of international law and 
it is often the only way of providing an effective remedy. Paragraph 1 seeks to 
strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation, on the basis that all States are 
called upon to make an appropriate response to the serious breaches referred to 
in article 40.”141 
The emerging doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ embodies a similar understanding of a 
two tier model of enforcement: the primary responsibility of protection of a population against 
crimes such as genocide lies with the State itself, while a complementary responsibility is located 
at the (collective) level of the international community.142 As Secretary-General Annan explains 
in the report In Larger Freedom, “The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as 
a source of authority but to make it work better”.143 Although this remark should be situated in 
the context of the use of force, the General Assembly seems to share this view in its reference to 
the responsibility to protect by failing to mention obligations for States to act on an individual 
basis in case of a genocide.144   
The Court seemed to refrain from taking a position on this issue when it stated that its decision 
should not be understood as to purport a finding ‘of a general obligation on States to prevent 
the commission by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general 
international law’.145 Although Judge Tomka also does not explicitly refer to the responsibility to 
protect, he does address the mechanism behind the emergence of the doctrine.146 Tomka argues 
that article VIII embodies the normative notion that genocide should be eliminated through 
international co-operation, and is primarily directed at the Security Council and alternatively 
the General Assembly. But in case article VIII can not be understood as to impose a legal 
obligation on the particular organs to act, should the obligation to prevent be understood as to 
require a State to act outside its territory to prevent acts of genocide? In response, he carefully 
phrases a warning against a too broad construction of the obligation, arguing that the status 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
141 Ibid, see commentary in same document.
142  See the UN GA resolution A/60/L.1 20 September 2005, paras. 138-139 and the report ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, published by the International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001.
143 United Nations doc. A/59/2005, para. 126.
144 UN GA resolution A/60/L.1 20 September 2005, paras. 138-139.
145  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 429. See 
also Molier 2007, supra note 137, p. 15.
146  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 17, Separate 
Opinion Judge Tomka, para. 66.
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of unilateral or plurilateral actions undertaken without Security Council authorization still 
remains controversial. Only authorized actions are ‘undoubtedly lawful and legitimate’ in his 
view.147 Thus, without rejecting the legality of what is best known as humanitarian interventions 
altogether, Tomka argues for a more conservative interpretation and dissents: only when a State 
exercises jurisdiction or effective control, it should be obligated under the Convention to act 
extra-territorially.148 
As the Court in this case does not provide concrete examples of measures that could be adopted 
under the preventative obligation, but only refers to a total lack of action on the side of Serbia, 
the actual contents and form of the obligation to prevent will have to be clarified by future 
practice or proceedings. For now, the most logical interpretation of the Court’s ruling on this 
issue is that the obligation to prevent under the genocide Convention is a special obligation, not 
comparable with other more general obligations to prevent. The Court emphasizes this view 
when it states that there are many different obligations to prevent under several international 
instruments, each of them varying in contents. The Court states that it does not aim to establish 
a general jurisprudence of a wide applicability to these obligations.149  
 
III.2 Genocide: A Crime or an International Wrongful Act?
The acceptance of a State as a perpetrator of genocide might not have directly extended the 
extra-territorial application of the Genocide Convention, but in the author’s opinion the 
Court contributed to the development of the law on State responsibility in a significant way. 
As explained in section II.2, under current international law only individuals are considered 
capable of committing crimes. As such, international law fails to accurately express the 
frequent involvement of the State apparatus in the perpetration of crimes and thus maintains a 
discrepancy between the accountability of the State and the individual. 
Although at a sociological level the involvement of the State in crimes under international law 
is increasingly recognized,150 until this judgment this had not found an appropriate reflection 
in the law on State responsibility. In this respect, challenging the oversimplified reading of the 
Nuremberg Judgment comes down to challenging a prevailing doctrine rather than interpreting 
just another consideration of a judicial organ. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
147 Idem, para. 66.
148 Idem, para. 67.
149 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 429.
150  For instance Penny Green & Tony Ward, State Crime, Governments, Violence and Corruption, London: Pluto Press 
2004, and Ronald C. Kramer & Raymond J. Michalowski, ‘War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological 
Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq’, British Journal of Criminology (45) 2005, pp. 446-469, David 
Kauzlarich and Ronald C. Kramer. Crimes of the American Nuclear State: At Home and Abroad. Boston:  Northeastern 
University Press 1998. 
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After all, the International Law Commission had to delete the notion of a ‘crime of state’ in the 
second reading of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, after it had featured prominently 
on the agenda since the 1970s in the form of draft article 19 (2):151 
“An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes 
an international crime.”152 
Though the concept was not intended to create a criminal responsibility analogous to domestic 
law, but only to reflect a normative hierarchy in the law on State responsibility, it still generated 
unwanted associations in that direction and was one of the reasons for abandoning the 
terminology of crime.153 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility James Crawford notes in 
the introduction to the commentaries on the articles that no principled considerations exclude 
the acceptance of a crime of State, but that such a term should only be used in the genuine sense 
of criminal responsibility or not at all.154 Since no institutional and procedural frameworks 
existed under contemporary international law to exercise a criminal jurisdiction over States, the 
introduction of the notion of a crime of State would have been a hazardous enterprise in light 
of the considerable division amongst States on the validity of such a concept.   
The fact that a distinction between ‘ordinary’ wrongful acts and crimes proved unsustainable 
for the time being, is indicative for the challenge the Court faced in this case, when it had to 
decide whether the reference to State responsibility for genocide could be read as to entail the 
idea that a State can actually perpetrate genocide itself. In the author’s view, there are persuasive 
arguments to consider this judgment a rehabilitation of the abandoned notion of former draft 
article 19. 
Firstly, the ruling of the Court should be construed as to mean that there is now a basis in 
positive law that a State can commit the crime of genocide. Though the Court repeatedly stated 
that the responsibility is not of a criminal nature, it can not credibly be denied that the act is. 
Article I unequivocally characterizes genocide as a crime:
“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake 
to prevent and to punish.”
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
151 UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 279
152 Yearbook ILC 1976, vol. II (2), pp. 95-122.
153  James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, 17 and 37-38, also Weiler, Cassese & Spinedi (eds), International 
Crimes of State, A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, Berlijn: De Gruyter 1989, 52.
154 Crawford 2002, supra note 153, pp. 16-20.
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The assertion of the Court that State perpetrated genocide means genocide ‘as defined in the 
Convention’ leads to the conclusion that the State can commit a crime.155 The fact that the 
Court treats genocide as a treaty violation, resulting in an international wrongful act cannot 
discard this fact.156 The wrongful act consists of an international crime. Under the current law 
of State responsibility this leads to the strained construction that the genocide is a crime when 
committed by an individual, but an international wrongful act when committed by the State.
Secondly, combined with the reference by the parties and the Court itself in terms of the 
exceptional gravity of the case, concerning ‘the most serious issues of State responsibility’157, the 
Court demonstrated by raising the standard of proof that either a finding on genocide or the 
imposition of appropriate compensation or perhaps the combination of both, is viewed as an 
additional serious consequence in comparison with less serious inter-State disputes. As such, it 
gives expression to the existence of an aggravated responsibility, or in a more contentious term 
a normative hierarchy. In fact, the discussions of the ILC show that particularly genocide was 
considered a typical crime of State.158  
The decision to use articles 2 and 3 as a legal basis for a determination of genocide by a State is 
also likely to affect the more general debate on State criminal responsibility. In opposition to this 
approach by the majority, several Judges opined that the acceptance of a State as a perpetrator of 
the crime of genocide as defined under the Convention, implicates the criminal responsibility 
of the State, which they reject as not being part of contemporary international law.159 One 
might agree to the extent that by establishing a criminal blame the nature of international State 
responsibility for the crime of genocide has moved further away from a civil-like responsibility in 
the direction of a (rudimentary) form of criminal responsibility.160 The increased prominence of 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
155 Supra note 66.
156  See for instance paragraph 401, where the Court discusses the rules of attribution that are applicable in case of 
genocide. It states that the rules do not vary with the nature of the wrongful acts, referring to genocide in particular.
157  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 2, para. 208.
150  It remains to be seen whether or how the articles on State responsibility could be affected by this ruling. Currently 
the General Assembly did not finally decide to incorporate the articles into a convention, postponing that decision to 
a later date: General Assembly Resolution 59/35, 2 Dec 2000; UN Doc A/RES/59/35, adopted at the 65th plenary 
meeting of the General Assembly (see UN Doc A/59/SR.65). As the Secretariat is requested to gather the relevant 
State practise and jurisprudence to support the General Assembly’s decision on how to proceed, it is not ruled out that 
this case might provide an incentive to re-assess a possible role for the concept of a crime of State.
159  The considerable opposition with regard to this point is not visible in the Judgment itself as the issue as such does not 
form part of the decisions in the operative part of the Judgment. Ad-hoc Judge Kreca argued that the acceptance of a 
State being capable of committing genocide inevitably leads to the criminal responsibility of the State (para. 129). Judge 
Tomka holds that the interpretation of a State committing genocide implicates ‘the criminal responsibility of States 
in international law’ (para. 55). Judges Shi and Koroma jointly hold that an outcome contrary to the plain meaning 
of the Convention is produced by the expansive interpretation of the majority, namely the criminal responsibility of 
the State (paras.1 and 4).  Judge Skotnikov argues that the Convention exclusively recognizes genocide as a crime, 
and argues that the Court’s approach not to treat it as such is not possible under the Convention. Implicitly, he seems 
to assert that if it would have done so, it would have accepted State criminal responsibility (first page of the merits). 
Judge Owada finally, rejects the interpretation of the majority, even though […] makes the justiciability of this act of 
genocide by a State […] somewhat less than criminal responsibility […] (para. 71).  
160  This conclusion would not be contradictory with the view of many authors that State responsibility is neither civil 
nor penal, but a sui generis responsibility. See Pellet, Alain, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!’, European 
Journal of International Law (10) 1999, p. 433. 
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truth finding, as demonstrated by the higher procedural standard, only supports this position. 
Although the Court and both parties denied the existence of such a notion in international law, 
the Court made a significant contribution to the debate by accepting that the State can have 
a mens rea, modelled after a criminal law provision. As explained in section II.1, in criminal 
doctrine the attribution of the subjective element forms a major impediment to the acceptance 
of criminal responsibility of legal entities. The acceptance of this notion in the law on State 
responsibility may facilitate the acceptance of a criminal responsibility of States in future 
debates.161   
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court took its responsibility to decide on the merits of the case, despite 
considerable legal difficulties. But in doing so, it refused to take a position on the membership 
of the UN of Serbia which is deplorable. The Court contributed to the development of the law 
on State responsibility in a significant way, deciding the issue of State perpetrated genocide 
where the drafters left the issue undecided. It did so basically ‘upstream’, considering the 
prevalent non-acceptance of State crime under international law and doctrine. In addition, it 
gave a progressive interpretation of the obligation to prevent which extends the extra-territorial 
scope in a way that makes it difficult to predict the immediate consequences. In this sense, the 
Court increased the overall accountability of States under international law and it should be 
applauded for that. 
The interrelated interpretation of complicity, the obligation to prevent and the causality of 
damage should be assessed as unnecessary restrictive. It seems the Court is too reserved with 
regard to translating the responsibility of Serbia into compensation. The same restrictive 
attitude was displayed with regard to the explicit request of Bosnia to request Serbia to submit 
the minutes of the Serbian Supreme Defence Council (SDC), which the Court was competent 
to do under article 49 of its Statute. These documents were suspected to contain vital evidence 
on Serbia’s involvement in the Bosnian war that could be decisive for the issues of attribution 
and intent. Since it has been demonstrated that truth finding took a more central place in this 
procedure by raising the standard of proof on account of the extreme gravity of the allegations, 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
161  The acceptance of States having a specific intent in the meaning of the Genocide Convention under the law on 
State responsibility has also been subject to much debate. Opinions vary from authors who insist that specific 
intent is simply a question of attribution as it is located at the primary rule of genocide, see Marko Milanovic, ‘State 
Responsibility for Genocide’, European Journal of International Law (17) 2006, pp. 553-604, to authors who point 
to the problematic issue of identifying a mens rea with a legal entity under current international law and exclude 
that possibility, see Schabas, supra note 46. In between various opinions can be found, for example that fault can 
be identified with the State, but it is separate from the primary rule, see A. Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? 
Definitely, Yes!’, European Journal of International Law (10) 1999, pp. 425-434 and Crawford, supra note 140, pp. 
12-14, who claims that particularly former draft article 19, which includes genocide, needs an explicit subjective 
element to be a viable concept. Gattini flags the unclear position of fault in the system of State responsibility, see 
Andrea Gattini, ‘Smoking/No Smoking: Some Remarks on the Current Place of Fault in the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility’, European Journal of International Law (10) 1999, pp. 397-404. For an insightful discussion 
see A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between individual responsibility and State responsibility in international law’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (52) 2003, pp. 633-635.

GRIFFIN’S VIEW Volume 8, Number 2
the Court shows an inconsistent approach by not asking for the documents. The gravity of the 
case demanded an active and not a passive bench in this case, a point of severe criticism of vice-
president Al-Khasawneh in his dissenting opinion.162  
That being said, one ought to be careful to speculate about the decisive value of the SDC 
documents. The failure of Bosnia to proof that Serbia fulfilled the role of accomplice to 
genocide, might be primarily located in the particular nature of genocide and the problems 
of proving the requirement of specific intent that characterizes it. Since international law does 
not provide for a convention on crimes against humanity, which are of equal gravity but do not 
require specific intent, Bosnia was forced to resort to a claim under the Genocide Convention.163 
This lacuna in international law should not compel judges to establish genocide too easily; 
something the Court was obviously well aware of. So in order to more accurately express the 
(future) involvement of States in international crimes, there is also a task for the international 
community to better equip the Court with jurisdiction over other crimes. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
162  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 13, Dissenting 
Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, paras. 35 and 62.
163  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 29, para. 277. The 
Court briefly hints at this difference, when it states that the facts may amount to crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, but that the Court lacks jurisdiction to do so.  
